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In this Working Document we look at which OECD countries deliberately attempt to reproduce social 
stratification through educational policies, and which countries put greater emphasis on intervening 
in the stratification process. First, we examine the relationship between education and welfare policies 
as measures of intervention in this process: do countries intervene in both education and welfare – 
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1.  Introduction 
Social stratification, defined as a “system with rather predictable rules behind the ranking of 
individuals and groups” (Kerbo, 2006, p. 1), is central to the organisation of every human 
society. The question of whether this stratification is natural and just has been debated for 
many centuries. In his classic treaty Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification, Lenski 
(1966) points out that the Greek philosophers provide us with the first glimpse of this 
dialectic in action. There are two competing arguments – one that attempts to preserve and 
replicate the existing social order (as represented by Aristotle) and the other that challenges 
and attempts to restructure it (represented by Phaleas). The reduction or elimination of 
inequality can be approached in two ways (see Roemer, 1998; 2008). Equality of outcome has 
traditionally been associated with the political left. It is concerned with the equalisation of 
income or wealth across individuals or households, usually through a redistribution of 
wealth from the richer to the poorer sectors of society. In contrast, equality of opportunity, 
‘levels the playing field’ so that all have a chance to achieve the same outcomes. Whether or 
not they do so depends on their choices and actions. With regard to education, equality of 
opportunity means a mix of policies that will ensure that the educational performance of 
students does not reflect circumstances that are beyond the student’s control, such as socio-
economic status (Roemer, 1998). 
The close alignment of these concepts with political ideologies implies that they are 
inherently related to belief systems. Without belief systems justifying the inequality or the 
need to restructure the existing social order, it is unlikely that a stratification system would 
remain stable over time (Kerbo, 2006, p. 1). However, the notion that moral ideas and values 
have a significant impact on the design of social policies has been debated (for a recent 
survey of literature, see van Oorschot, 2007). The debate revolves around the issue of the 
deservingness of needy people and suggests significant differences across countries. 
Whereas the ‘social blame perspective’ is still prevalent in Europe, the ‘victim-blaming’ view 
predominates in America (van Oorschot & Halman, 2000). However, even in Europe, the 
concept of deservingness is not universal across needy groups (van Oorschot, 2006): elderly 
people are seen as the most deserving, closely followed by sick and disabled people; 
unemployed people are seen as less deserving still and immigrants as the least deserving of 
all. 
In this paper we explore which countries deliberately attempt to reproduce social 
stratification through social and educational policies, and which put greater emphasis on 
intervening in the stratification process. To this end, we use cluster analysis to identify sets of 
countries with similar educational policies and similar social policies. We restrict our sample 2 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
to those OECD countries for which all the indicators we use are available. Unfortunately, this 
procedure forces us to leave out France, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In 
the next step, we compare these clusters with the traditional Esping-Andersen (1990) welfare 
regime typology to see whether there is a match between the educational model clusters and 
the welfare regime clusters. Esping-Andersen’s typology is based on both stratification and 
decommodification. Our results show that countries do not always adopt the same approach 
in the education and social policy fields, but that careful disaggregation of differences allows 
for the identification of relatively robust clusters. The results of the research can serve as a 
basis for a more sophisticated analysis of interaction between welfare and education policies. 
It can also illuminate the limits of policy change, given the underlying patterns of welfare 
state and education policies in different countries. In other words, if there is such a thing as a 
stratification culture permeating many policy areas, proposed policy change in a single area 
might not be approved, implemented or indeed achieve the desired goals. 
2.  Theoretical background 
2.1  Welfare regimes as a source of stratification 
In his influential book Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) defines a 
welfare regime along two dimensions: i) the level of decommodification, i.e. the degree to 
which a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market, and ii) 
stratification, i.e. the extent to which welfare systems differ in the structuring of social 
relations. Based on these criteria, he identifies three ideal welfare regimes – liberal, 
conservative and social-democratic. We will discuss these regimes from the perspective of 
stratification; the main subject of this section. 
As Esping-Andersen (1990, p. 58) argues, 
“[w]elfare states may be equally large or comprehensive, but with entirely different 
effects on social structure. One may cultivate hierarchy and status, another dualisms, 
and a third universalism. Each case will produce its own unique fabric of social 
solidarity.” 
The corporatist welfare regime characteristic of Germany, Austria, France or Italy puts 
emphasis on the preservation of traditional status differentials in society. The benefits are 
therefore linked to the contributions paid by wage-earners to the national insurance schemes. 
Although these regimes have been historically associated with significant levels of social 
expenditure, the effects of redistribution are negligible. The liberal welfare states are built on 
the idea that a free market allows individuals to realise their potential, regardless of the pre-
existing social hierarchies. The redistribution from rich to poor is therefore rather limited. 
Modest benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working class state-
dependants. But whereas liberal regimes exhibit more inequality with respect to most 
indicators, such as income, Gini co-efficient or housing patterns, they are more socially 
inclusive than conservative regimes regarding educational participation and post-primary 
completion rates (Pechar & Andres, 2011). This reflects the dominance of the equality of 
opportunity in national discourse, where equal access to education is used to make citizens 
competitive in the labour market. Finally, the social-democratic regimes are based on the 
principles of universalism and decommodification of social rights. In contrast to the liberal 
regimes, which promote an equality of minimal needs, social democratic regimes promote an 
equality of the highest standards. The result is a peculiar combination of policies based on 
the principle of equality of outcome (such as high redistribution from the rich to the poor) EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 3 
 
and policies based on the principle of equality of opportunity (such as equal access to 
education).1 
Esping-Andersen’s work triggered a vigorous academic debate (for a recent overview, see 
Bambra, 2007 or Arcanjo, 2006). In the process, various criticisms were raised regarding the 
classification of certain countries, the gender-blindness of the original Esping-Andersen 
typology or various methodological problems. The most intensely debated aspect was the 
range of countries: Esping-Andersen examined 18 OECD countries, but this sample choice 
was questioned. Particular attention was paid to the classification of Italy and Japan as 
conservative welfare regimes. With regard to Italy, some argue that when the Southern 
European countries are covered, a fourth ‘Southern’ or ‘Mediterranean’ cluster of welfare 
regimes emerges (see Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996; Ferreira & Figuardo, 2005). This Southern 
European welfare state is characterised by a high degree of fragmentation of social security 
and a high reliance on family (Ferrera, 1996).  
On a similar note, it has been suggested that the Japanese welfare regime is more like that of 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore than the conservative welfare regime of 
Germany, France or Austria (Aspalter, 2006; Croissant, 2004; Walker, 2005). This Confucian 
welfare regime is characterised by low levels of government intervention and investment in 
social welfare, underdeveloped public service provision and the importance of family and 
voluntary social nets (Bambra, 2007, p. 1100).  
Finally, the enlargement of the European Union eastwards sparked a new interest in Central 
and Eastern European countries and their possible classification into existing welfare regime 
clusters (Ferreira & Figuardo, 2005; Fenger, 2007). This stream of welfare regime research 
suggests that there are significant differences between post-communist countries. Ferreira 
and Figuardo (2005) argue that some of the new countries cluster with the main group of old 
EU countries, whereas others form an entirely new cluster. Fenger (2007) analyses an 
exclusive sample of post-communist countries and suggests that welfare states in post-
communist countries might be subdivided into three groups: i) a group of former-USSR 
countries, including Russia and Belarus; ii) a group of rather successful Central and Eastern 
European countries, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and iii) a group of 
developing welfare states, consisting of Romania, Moldova and Georgia. The welfare regime 
types thus seem to be sensitive to the sample size. 
Attention has also been paid to Esping-Andersen’s analytical focus on cash benefits: 
pensions, sickness benefits and unemployment benefits and ignorance to other domains of 
the welfare state, such as health care, education or social services (Bambra, 2005a; 2005b; 
2007; Kautto, 2002). The failure to take into account care and provision services triggered a 
growing stream of literature that examines the welfare regimes though the gender lens 
(Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1994; Bambra, 2006). The major criticism was related to the 
importance of gender as a form of social stratification and the importance of women and the 
family in the provision of welfare. Once childcare, care for elderly or parental benefits are 
taken into account, the countries do not cluster into distinct groups corresponding to welfare 
state regimes (see Sainsbury, 1999, Chapter 8). In the area of childcare, France, Denmark, 
Italy, Sweden, Belgium and Finland formed the cluster of countries with ambitious childcare 
provision and policies to support the employment of mothers. The liberal states clustered 
                                                      
1 For an indication of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) classification see column 1 in Table 2: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg and the Netherlands belong to the conservative regime; 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden belong to the social-democratic regime; Ireland and 
the United Kingdom can be classed under the liberal regime; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia are classified as the CEE countries. 4 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
together because of low provision and few supportive policies but again, the liberal cluster 
was joined by the Netherlands, Germany and Norway.  
Second, there seems to be a trade-off between the provision of services for children and the 
elderly: the countries that lead in providing childcare are laggards in providing care for the 
elderly, and vice versa. Similarly, differences in the treatment of single mothers as earners, 
carers, or earner-carers cut across welfare regimes. The absence of generous social transfers 
creates incentives for mothers in the US, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Canada and Belgium to 
seek paid work. By contrast, social benefits were the key component of mothers’ income in 
the Netherlands, the UK and Australia. In the third group of countries – Sweden, France and 
Finland, benefits and earnings were roughly equal. This earner-carer regime thus supported 
single parents as mothers and as workers. The tax relief to the family provider and the 
punitive effects of taxation on married women also suggests the existence of clusters that are 
different from those proposed by Esping-Andersen.  
Based on these findings, Sainsbury (1999) describes the dynamics between the policy logics 
of gender regimes and welfare state regimes as follows. Conservative regimes attempt to 
replicate the existing social order by prescribing that benefits should correspond to 
contributions. In combination with the logic of the male breadwinner that upholds the 
traditional family, it leads to contradictory results for mothers and parents: women provide 
care for others but are less likely to be eligible for benefits to pay for their own care, or they 
are eligible only for means-tested benefits. The liberal regime rests on the principle of 
minimal state intervention in the economy and family life. Families and individuals are 
therefore expected to support and care for themselves. Cash benefits for families are 
therefore at low levels compared to the conservative and social-democratic regimes, and 
family services are targeted to the needy. Finally, the social-democratic regimes are built 
around the notion that state intervention can modify the effects of market forces and achieve 
greater social equality. The predominant regime is that of earner-carer, which envisions 
greater equality between women and men and the transformation of the traditional division 
of labour between the sexes. Social rights are therefore granted to the individual, 
independent of family relationships.  
Esping-Andersen acknowledged this criticism and the importance of ‘familialism’ or ‘de-
familiarisation’. He identified two dimensions of familialism – the public policies aimed at 
families and the welfare burden assumed by them (Esping-Andersen, 1999). He declared 
‘family’ to be one of the pillars of the welfare regime alongside the state and the market: 
Seen from the perspective of either the citizen or of society, our welfare comes 
inevitably from the combination of family, market and government inputs. Indeed, 
for most people throughout most of their lives, the all-dominant source of welfare is 
derived from the family and market. We receive most of our income from the market 
and typically most of our social support from family members. From a life cycle 
perspective, the welfare state only really gains prominence when we are very young 
or old. (Esping-Andersen, 2007, p. 3). 
Finally, Esping-Andersen’s typology was also questioned on methodological grounds 
(Bambra, 2006; Scruggs & Allan, 2006; 2008; Kangas, 1994, Ragin, 1994; Pitruzello, 1999). The 
recent studies replicating Esping-Andersen’s call into question the historical and continued 
utility of the Three Worlds typology (for revision of welfare decommodification, see Scruggs 
& Allan, 2006 and Bambra, 2006; for revision of welfare stratification, see Scruggs & Allan, 
2008). The accuracy of Esping-Andersen’s typology was also challenged by more statistically 
robust methodologies, predominantly cluster analysis. EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 5 
 
2.2  Education as the process of stratification 
Education is a powerful predictor of future earnings. There are substantial earnings returns 
to quantitative measures of education, such as years of schooling (Card, 1999; Ashenfelter et 
al., 1999). The earnings returns to qualitative measures of education seem to be even higher 
and increasing with an individual’s time on the labour market (Bishop, 1992; Riviera-Batiz, 
1992; Altonji & Pierret, 2001). Equal access to education can be thus a powerful tool to 
replicate or restructure the existing social order.  
We define educational stratification as educational inheritance and mobility between 
generations, i.e. the ways in which social and economic advantages and disadvantages are 
passed on from one generation to the next. As Menchik (1979) reminds us, for any degree of 
inequality we can have a relatively static society in which children always assume their 
parents’ position, or a highly mobile society in which the position of the child is unrelated to 
that of his/her parents. Indeed, there are large differences in educational persistence 
between countries.  
Using 50-year trends in the interregional persistence of educational attainment for a sample 
of 42 countries, Hertz et al. (2007) document that Latin America displays the highest 
intergenerational correlations (regional average 0.6) and the Nordic countries the lowest 
(regional average 0.34). The Western European correlations range from 0.30 in Denmark to 
0.54 in Italy. The liberal economies score differently: the correlation in the US and Ireland is 
0.46. In contrast, New Zealand and the UK score relatively low (0.33 and 0.31 respectively).2 
The effects of the communism are mixed. It would be reasonable to assume that the 
correlations would be low; however, they range from 0.2 in rural China and 0.28 in 
Kyrgyzstan to 0.41 as the average of the Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, despite these country 
differences, the global average correlation between a parent and child’s schooling has held 
steady at about 0.4 for the past 50 years.  
In addition to the transmission of educational attainment between generations, it is 
reasonable to also look at the link between student performance and family socio-economic 
status. The research suggests that family background has a strong effect on student 
performance (Willms & Somers, 2001; Woessmann, 2004; OECD, 2009). On average, young 
people from lower socio-economic backgrounds perform worse than those from more 
advantaged backgrounds. However, the strength of this relationship varies considerably 
among countries, suggesting that some governments are more successful than others in 
reducing disparities associated with socio-economic status (Willms, 2006, p. 8). One of the 
most comprehensive datasets comes from the OECD’s PISA programme, which compares 
the mathematics, literacy and science performance of students aged 15. OECD (2009) 
concludes that parental education is the most important determinant of student 
performance. However, parental occupational status, household type, migrant status and 
language are important as well. The negative impact of having a father with low education is 
strongest in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Germany and Turkey; in contrast, the 
negative effect is smallest in Finland, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. 
Woessmann (2004) reaches similar conclusions when looking at the effects of family-
background characteristics on student performance in the US and 17 Western European 
school systems. He argues that family background has similar effects in both Europe and the 
United States. The most equitable performance for students from different family 
backgrounds is achieved in France and Flemish Belgium. In contrast, the UK and Germany 
have the lowest degree of equality of opportunity. Differences between 13 Latin American 
                                                      
2 It should be noted that other studies suggest different levels of intergenerational mobility. Relying on 
longitudinal data for a cohort of individuals born in the UK in a week of March 1958, Dearden et al. 
(1997) suggest an intergenerational educational elasticity of 0.45.  6 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
countries were documented by Willms and Somers (2001). In their analysis they relied on 
UNESCO’s PEIC data. Cuba was the most successful country in disentangling the link 
between family background and school performance.  
These differences across countries are not entirely stable over time. In their seminar study, 
Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) report stability of socio-economic inequalities in educational 
attainment over much of the 20th century in all but two (Sweden and Netherlands) of 13 
countries in their sample. However, recent studies challenge their conclusions and identify a 
widespread decline in educational inequality between students of different social origins. 
Breen et al. (2009) argue that this was most pronounced in Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, 
Germany and France, and less so in Italy, Ireland and Poland. Hertz et al (2007) show that 
the standardised intergenerational schooling correlation increased over time in the US and 
the UK, whereas it decreased in the Netherlands and Finland. Esping-Andersen (2004) 
arrived at similar conclusions using IALS (International Adult Literacy Survey) data: the 
negative effect of fathers with a low level of education diminished sharply in Scandinavia, 
especially for the very youngest cohorts, born around 1970. In contrast, the effect persisted in 
Germany, the UK and the US.  
What factors played a major role in the reduction of these inequalities? We are particularly 
interested in differences in the organisational features of the school system, through which 
equality of educational opportunity is achieved, as these can be influenced by governmental 
policy. Schutz et al. (2005) suggest that late tracking and a long pre-primary cycle are 
beneficial to equality of opportunity, while pre-school enrolment has a detrimental influence 
at low levels of enrolment and is beneficial at higher levels. Furthermore, they argue that 
equality is negatively related to private school financing but positively to private provision 
of education.3 The positive impact of increasing the age of tracking in the case of Finland was 
also emphasised by Pekkarinen et al. (2006).
 Breen et al. (2009) also point to economic growth 
and welfare state expansion. 
2.3  Clusters of educational models and/or policies 
The clustering of educational models or more concrete educational policies can be 
approached from various perspectives – educational, industrial relations/labour market 
studies, economics or political science (for a recent survey, see Ashton et al., 2008). There are 
numerous clusters or typologies, which are based on different criteria. The narrow criteria 
usually focus on educational arrangements (educational perspective); the broader attempt to 
link skill formation to the labour market (industrial relations/labour market studies). Finally, 
there is a growing body of literature that explores educational models through the welfare 
lens of political economy. Although these clusters are the result of differing approaches, 
there is an intriguing match between clusters produced by various authors.  
2.3.1  Educational perspective 
The first set of clusters is based on the differences between education arrangements, such as 
universal vs. differentiated schools, integrated vs. separated sectors of schooling or years of 
schooling at various levels. These models attempt to isolate key characteristics of a particular 
system that distinguish it from other systems. The influential Furth (1985) typology is based 
on the post-compulsory vocational training arrangements. He suggests that there are three 
models of educational provision: the schooling model that integrated most forms of 
provision within the formal educational system (typical of the US, Canada and Japan), the 
dual model that was characterised by a strong and highly developed apprenticeship sector 
associated with West Germany, Switzerland and Austria, and the mixed model where 
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schools are complemented by a less formal sector of mainly work-based education, typical of 
the UK. This typology has been utilised by Green (1991) who suggests the existence of three 
models, the employer-led model that provides a work-based system of training (e.g. 
Germany), the education-led, college-based model, which provides both general and 
vocational training but in different institutions (France, Italy and Japan) and the education-
led, college-based system that provides general and vocational training within the same 
institution (Sweden).  
In contrast to Furth (1985) and Green (1991) who focus on post-compulsory education, 
Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Warner’s (2007) typology is based on educational arrangements at all 
levels of education.  
The first type, represented by Germany, rests on a short number of years of primary 
schooling and a differentiated lower and upper secondary sector. The tertiary sector consists 
of parallel schools, which provide further vocational education, applied universities and a 
greater number of academic high schools and universities. The lower secondary, the upper 
secondary and the tertiary sectors are clearly separated from each other.  
The second type, represented by Luxembourg, rests on a greater number of years of primary 
schooling, a limited number of school types at lower secondary level and different types of 
general and vocational schools upper secondary level. The tertiary sector schooling consists 
of academic vocational education and universities, which are separated from lower and 
upper secondary schools.  
The third type is represented by Denmark. Both primary and secondary schooling sectors are 
integrated. The primary school and the lower secondary school are combined in a 
comprehensive school. The upper secondary sector consists of many types of general schools 
and one type of vocational school. There is a small difference between vocational and 
university education at the tertiary level.  
Finally, France is characterised by high rates of pre-primary enrolment. Primary schooling 
takes a greater number of years and there is no differentiation in the lower secondary sector. 
There is low vertical differentiation in the upper secondary sector. On the other hand, the 
tertiary sector is much more differentiated. This typology is in line with the typology of the 
Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP, 2004), which proposes four clusters:  
1)  Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Hungary and the Czech Republic,  
2)  Luxembourg, Austria and Slovakia,  
3)  Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia,  
4)  France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the UK, Cyprus, Malta and Australia.
  
2.3.2  Labour market perspective 
The major strength of the educational perspective lies in its ability to identify and abstract 
key features of the different educational systems. However, with the exception of historical 
studies (see, for example, Green, 1999), it fails to explain how these particular systems 
evolved. Labour market perspective overcomes this shortcoming, and provides explanations 
for different types of educational models, particularly in regard to the ways in which 
educational systems are formed by and respond to labour markets. The key to 
understanding the development and operation of educational systems is to understand the 
organisation of work within enterprises (Marsden, 1986; Maurice et al., 1986; Sorge & 
Warner, 1980). 
Green (1991), although still writing from the educational perspective, effectively links 
educational systems to labour markets and industrial development. He offers the typology of 8 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
five primary models of education and training systems within Western Europe and East 
Asia, associated with Japan, Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. The state 
developmentalist model associated with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore is highly 
centralised and puts strong emphasis on the development of group cohesion and personal 
skills, which are conducive to both the cohesive and orderly citizenship and disciplined and 
cooperative labour. To this end, general high schools predominate over vocational high 
schools and universities offer very broad programmes, even when they are specifically 
vocational. The German system, replicated in Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands, is 
relatively decentralised. It is characterised by streaming at the secondary level, where 
academic ability is the main selection factor. The French model is characterised by strong 
central control, comprehensive systems of compulsory schooling and school-based systems 
of upper secondary education. National education is standardised. The Swedish model rests 
on unstreamed classes with automatic grade promotion. Comprehensive high school is the 
dominant institution. There is a strong emphasis on equality and social solidarity, which is 
ensured by strong central control. Finally, in England and Wales state control in education is 
limited and institutions are granted autonomy. Post-compulsory education consists of both 
school-based and work-based elements. 
2.3.3  Approaches linking welfare and education 
There is a growing body of literature that attempts to examine educational policies through a 
welfare lens. This is done either from the perspective of expenditure (Hega & Hokeinmeier, 
2002; Ansell, 2008; Pechar & Andres, 2011) or from the perspective of equality (Allmendinger 
& Leibfried, 2003; Peter et al., 2010).  
Although education is one of the components of the welfare state, along with health care, 
employment and social security, there is a group of scholars who suggest that there is trade-
off between investment in education and investment in other welfare policies 
(Heidenheimer, 1981; Heclo, 1985; Castles, 1989). The trade-off thesis builds on the 
assumption that education and social security programmes are viewed as alternative 
strategies (Heidenheimer, 1981, p. 269). Countries thus invest either in educational 
opportunities or in social insurance programmes to ensure equality of conditions. 
Educational policies can thus be viewed as preventive and prospective, whereas other social 
policies are retrospective and compensatory (Allmendinger & Leibfried, 2003). This trade-off 
thesis thus helps to explain the paradox that although liberal regimes exhibit more inequality 
with respect to most indicators, such as income, Gini co-efficient or housing patterns, they 
are more socially inclusive than conservative regimes with regard to educational 
participation and post-primary completion rates (Pechar & Anndres, 2011). 
Hega and Hokenmeier (2002) attempt to link the trade-off thesis to Esping-Andersens’s 
(1990) theory of three types of welfare state (liberal, conservative and social-democratic). To 
this end, they examine the relationship between spending on education and social insurance 
programmes in 18 OECD countries in the period 1960-1990. They conclude that welfare 
states with similar social insurance policies will also cluster according to the similarity of 
their educational policies. Expenditure on social insurance exceeds expenditure on education 
in conservative states, relative to other welfare state types. Social democratic states lead the 
conservative and liberal states in both social insurance and educational commitments, 
measured in real dollars per capita. Finally, whereas the social insurance spending in liberal 
states is the smallest, spending on education is higher than in conservative states. 
Furthermore, the liberal states lead in general education participation at the secondary level, 
at a rate significantly higher than that of conservative and social democratic states. These 
findings support the trade-off thesis that liberal states support general education curricula at 
the post-primary level to provide the individual with the necessary human capital to succeed 
in the labour market, thereby minimising future expenditure on social programmes.  EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 9 
 
Two papers attempt to transcend such a binary trade-off. First, Ansell (2008) argues that 
higher education policy in the OECD countries is driven by partisan choices within a 
trilemma between the level of enrolment, the degree of subsidisation, and the overall public 
cost of higher education. He claims that governments can achieve at most two of three 
objectives of mass enrolment, full subsidisation, and relatively low total public cost. As a 
result, governments choose: 
1)  mass, partially private, inexpensive higher education system – the partially private 
model, 
2)  mass, fully public, expensive higher education system – the mass public model, or 
3)  an inexpensive, publicly funded, elite higher education system – the elite model.  
Furthermore, Ansell argues that the dynamics within the trilemma are driven by the 
partisanship conditional on the structure of the existing higher education system. When 
existing enrolment is low, right-wing parties opt to increase spending on higher education 
and the expansion of enrolment. In contrast, left-wing parties opt to expand public funding 
only when enrolment has reached mass levels. At this point, right-wing parties seek to limit 
further expansion.  
Pechar and Anders (2011) further expand the number of trade-offs faced when expanding 
the higher-education system. They argue that it is impossible to achieve all of the following 
goals at the same time: low taxation, low or no tuition fees, high non-repayable student aid, 
and a high participation rate in adequately funded higher-education institutions. Their 
findings suggest that the trade-off hypothesis is confirmed only for liberal and conservative 
regimes. However, social-democratic countries seem to avoid some of the trade-offs and are 
able to expand higher education without neglecting those who are unable or unwilling to 
make use of the educational opportunity. Nevertheless, they do it at the cost of interfering 
with the supply and demand of higher learning opportunities by, for example, limiting the 
seats for research universities.  
Although the exploration of educational models in terms of social expenditure is necessary 
to understand the evolution of governmental support for various educational models, this 
focus underemphasises how educational policy structures social relations: 
(…) welfare states [and this holds also for educational models] may be equally large 
or comprehensive, but with entirely different effects on social structure. One may 
cultivate hierarchy and status, another dualism, and a third universalism. Each case 
will produce its own unique fabric of social solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 58). 
As size is not a good predictor of the educational model’s impact on social stratification, it is 
useful to explore the direct link to inequality.  
Peter et al. (2010) study the fit of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare typology with regard to 
education policy. They use multilevel statistical techniques to cross-nationally compare the 
within- and between-school difference in socio-economic gradients in student achievement. 
The results show that conservative welfare states, as a group, have the highest between-
school gradients for maths, reading and science; social-democratic countries have the lowest 
between-school gradients and liberal welfare states fall somewhere in between. In other 
words, variation in the socio-economic composition of a school has the greatest impact on 
student achievement in conservative and the least in social-democratic regimes.  
Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, we explore which countries deliberately 
use educational policy to replicate or reverse the existing social order and compare the 
identified sets of clusters with the original Esping-Andersen typology, as well as our own 
typology based on social stratification via a public pension system. 10 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
As specified above, the main aim of this paper is to explore which countries deliberately 
attempt to reproduce social stratification through educational policies and which countries 
put greater emphasis on intervening in the stratification process. We consider educational 
policies as intervening in the stratification process when i) the state as opposed to the market 
provides learning frameworks that could counterbalance a non-learning friendly 
environment for the child at home and ii) when students are not streamed into ability 
groups. Conversely, education policies that maintain social stratification are those that a) 
leave it to the market to provide additional learning frameworks or opportunities or b) 
group students into ability group at an early stage.  
We are also interested in the relation between education policies and welfare policies as 
measures of intervention in the stratification process: do countries intervene on both 
education and welfare – driven by a ‘stratification culture’? Or is there a trade-off between 
education and welfare and countries intervene on either education or welfare? We consider 
welfare policies as intervening in the stratification process when state benefits do not 
reproduce the social stratification that has developed through income.  
To answer these questions, we propose to use a set of indicators that measure stratifying 
factors in education and in welfare policies (see Table 1). In most cases we do not measure 
the formal policies themselves but rather their outcome. We measure the possible influence 
of education policies on social stratification by the explicit stratification within the state-
organised system and by the provision of learning environments through the state on the 
one hand or through the market or the family on the other hand. The possible influence of 
welfare policies on stratification is measured by stratification present in the pension system 
and by the degree to which the state provides pension benefits as opposed to the market. The 
reasons for using pension data are i) that pensions are a major part of social expenditure and 
ii) because detailed data of replacement rates by income is available.  
The choice of variables is based upon findings by the OECD literature on the PISA findings 
(for example, Causa & Chapuis, 2009; OECD, 2010). Causa and Chapuis (2009) show links 
between i) early differentiation (streaming or stratification) of students by ability and socio-
economic inequality ii) early intervention and childcare policies and socio-economic 
inequality and iii) social benefits and socio-economic inequality. OECD (2010, p.78) stresses 
that school resources – such as learning time or extracurricular activities, are a key factor in 
determining the link between socio-economic background and educational performance.  
We choose two variables to measure the explicit stratification within the state-organised 
system: variance between schools (level of effective streaming) and variance of outcomes 
within schools when measured by different reading ability groups at the age of 15. Within-
school variance is measured as the part of the variance in reading performance explained by 
the within-school variation and accordingly – between-school streaming is measured by the 
part of the variance in reading performance explained by between-school variation. These 
variables indicate how far a country displays large differences in performance within and 
across schools. A high between-school variance in reading performance indicates that pupils 
of different reading capacity are to a large extent streamed into different schools. A high 
within-school variance in reading performance indicates that societal differences play out 
within schools and that schools have mixed pupils in terms of reading performance. A 
higher within-school variance could be believed to be more favourable for students of lower 
ability since they might be able to benefit from the peer group effects initiated by stronger 
pupils.  
Another set of measures is selected to determine the degree to which either the state or the 
market or family provide learning environments. In particular we study participation in EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 11 
 
institutional childcare, the average number of hours spent at school per year and the average 
number of weekly hours spent in lessons out of school. For the time spent in lessons outside 
school we use the average time as well as the variance in time spent in lessons outside 
school.  
Three variables measure the extent to which pensions are stratified, i.e. earnings-related. The 
first indicator shows the ratio between the pensions of an individual who earned an income 
twice as high as the median earner and the pensions of a median earner. The second 
indicator shows the ratio between pensions of the median earner and the pensions of an 
individual who earned half the income of the median earner. The third indicator measures 
the pension replacement rate of the median earner. The first two indicators measure the 
explicit stratification present in the pension system whereas the third indicator measures to 
what extent the state provides pensions as opposed to the market or other private sources.  
Pensions are chosen as being representative of social policy for two reasons. First, they 
represent a major item in social expenditure. Second, the detailed data that would enable us 
to calculate the deliberate government stratification via other social policies, such as family 
allowances or unemployment benefits, are not available.  
As Table 1 shows, we select data from different sources – the PISA dataset, the OECD 
database, and Eurostat. We choose the most recent available years, which range from 2009-
2011. Our sample consists of 22 countries (for summary statistics see Table A1): Austria, 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. As mentioned above, the country selection is subject to 
data availability of all indicators. Due to data availability issues we needed to exclude 
France, the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia from our analysis. 12 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
Table 1. Indicator descriptions and sources 
Indicator  Source
Education Stratification
Variance between schools (STR1)  Variance in student performance between schools (measured on the reading scale), expressed as a percentage of PISA  (2009) 
the average variance in student performance across OECD countries. 
Variance within schools (STR2) Variance in student performance within schools (measured on the reading scale), expressed as a percentage of PISA (2009) 
the average variance in student performance across OECD countries. 
Learning Environment Provision
Early childhood education (LE1) Participants in institutional childcare or ISCED 0-1 at ages 3-5; average of ranked values.  EUROSTAT (2008/2009)
Hours spent at school (LE2) Weighted sum over hours per year of total compulsory and non-compulsory instruction time in the curriculum  OECD (2008)
for 7-8, 9-11, 12-14 year-olds, "Education at a Glance". 
Extracurricular activity - Average of out of school time lessons (<2, 2-4, 4-6,>6h) in language, mathematics, science and other subjects PISA (2009) 
Mean (LE3) for 7 to 15 year olds.
Extracurricular activity - Variance of out of school time lessons (<2, 2-4, 4-6,>6h) in language, mathematics, science and other subjects  PISA (2009) 
Variance (LE4) for 7 to 15 year olds.
Welfare Stratification
Pension stratification 1 (PEN1) Ratio between replacement rate of the 2*median earner to the median earner, "Pensions at a Glance" OECD (2011)
Pension stratification 2 (PEN2) Ratio between replacement rate of the median earner to the 0.5*median earner,"Pensions at a Glance".  OECD (2011)
Welfare Provision
Pension etatism (PEN3) Replacement rate of the median earner, "Pensions at a Glance".  OECD (2011)
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In order to divide countries into different policy regimes, one can either form groups of 
countries according to a set of indicators (cluster analysis) or imagine a set of political 
concepts underlying the political characteristics of a country and give each country a score 
on each of the concepts (factor or principal component analysis).4 In this analysis we are 
more interested in providing a typology of countries rather than determining factors 
characterising a political regime. So we turn to cluster analysis for our study.  
To detect clusters of countries in terms of stratifying policies we use two different clustering 
techniques:5 agglomerative hierarchical clustering with p-values and model-based clustering 
with a model selection strategy.6 The former allows the computing of more tentative clusters 
while the latter distinguishes more distinct clusters (Danforth, 2010, p. 10).Together the two 
methodologies give a picture of both reliable and tentative clusters. Clustering techniques 
allow forming groups of data points, which are ideally homogeneous within groups and 
heterogeneous across groups.  
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering is based on distance measures between data points 
and is a widely used method to discern clusters without pre-determining the number of 
clusters beforehand. In agglomerative hierarchical clustering the data is first divided into 
singleton clusters which are then merged to larger clusters in subsequent steps. There are 
several criteria and several distance measures for deciding upon which data points to merge. 
We use Ward’s method (based on the error sum of squares) and the Euclidean distance, 
which is the most commonly used method (Danforth, 2010, p. 12). Often there is no objective 
criterion for these methods to determine the optimal number of clusters (Edwards, 2003, p. 
18; Danforth, 2010, p. 12). However, Suzuki and Shimodaira (2006) have developed a way to 
compute p-values using bootstrap resampling techniques. These p-values are computed for 
each cluster and indicate how much the data supports the cluster.7 Results of hierarchical 
clustering are usually illustrated by so-called dendrograms – tree-like graphs in which 
branches indicate clusters and leaves are the objects to be clustered.  
Model-based clustering is based on probability theory – and not on distance like hierarchical 
clustering techniques. The approach to address the clustering problem as a problem of 
estimating parameters of a mixture of probability distributions can be traced back to Wolfe 
(1970). Fraley and Raftery (1998) have developed a model-based clustering methodology in 
which each cluster is assumed to be a component of a normal mixture distribution.8 Using a 
Bayesian Information Criterion, an optimal model for the normal mixture distribution is 
selected together with the optimal number of components or clusters and a set of parameters 
characterising the normal mixture distribution.  
The advantage of model-based clustering as opposed to hierarchical clustering is that the 
former is not sensitive to the choice of a distance measure and a similarity criterion,9 which 
can be a problem of hierarchical clustering. In model-based clustering a maximum likelihood 
criterion is used. A good performance of model-based clustering as opposed to existing 
methods has been documented in Fraley and Raftery (1998, p. 1). In addition, Fraley and 
Raftery (1998, p. 3) report that hierarchical clustering methods are either computing time- or 
                                                      
4 See, for example, Arts and Gelisssen (2002, p. 152) 
5 For the programming of these techniques we use the packages ‘mclust’ and ‘pvclust’ implemented in 
R version 2.12.2.  
6 In the choice of these two methods we follow Danforth (2010). 
7 The Null hypothesis that the cluster does not exist is tested. Rejecting the Null hypothesis with 
significance 0.1 indicates a strong support of the data for the cluster. 
8 A normal mixture distribution is a convex combination of a set of normal distributions.  
9 Fraley and Raftery (1998:2) call these criteria “heuristic”. 14 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
space-consuming. On the other hand, model-based clustering is based on parametric 
assumptions on the mixture models, which can be too restrictive in some cases.  
In order to perform both hierarchical clustering and model-based clustering techniques, we 
standardise the data. Non-standardised data can be problematic for hierarchical clustering 
since differences in scaling can put different weight on the variables during the clustering 
procedure. Standardised data also eases the convergence of the algorithm used in model-
based clustering. For model-based clustering we set a conjugate prior on the means and 
variances. Setting a prior eases the convergence of the algorithm. We used the default of nine 
maximum possible clusters. For the hierarchical clustering with p-values, we set 1000 
bootstrap replications. 
4.  Results10 
The results are presented in two steps: first we compare our indicators of stratification 
present in the education and the pension system to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology in 
order to detect possible similarities. In a second step we take the analysis further and use two 
types of cluster analyses to determine new clusters of countries present in the data.  
4.1  Descriptive statistics: the relationship with Esping-Andersen’s 
typology 
A first purely visual inspection of the data (see Figures 1 to 5 and Table 3 below) indicates 
that educational stratification seems to be more common in conservative countries than in 
social-democratic ones. The social-democratic (or Nordic) model is characterised by a small 
degree of educational streaming between schools, high participation in institutional childcare 
(with the exception of Finland), a small amount o f  t i m e  s p e n t  a t  s c h o o l  o r  i n  m a r k e t -
provided learning and a not very egalitarian pension system of differing size. The 
conservative model can be described by a comparatively high degree of educational 
streaming, a relatively high participation in institutional childcare, a comparatively high 
number of hours spent in school or market-provided learning environments and a rather 
non-egalitarian pension system. Liberal countries are the most egalitarian in terms of the 
pension system, a relatively low degree of educational streaming, low participation in 
institutional childcare or extracurricular activity but a high number of hours spent at school. 
The literature building upon Esping-Andersen (1990) has detected two additional clusters for 
Mediterranean and Central-European economies (CEE). Our data supports treating them 
separately from the original set of clusters detected by Esping-Andersen (1990). CEE 
countries are similar to conservative countries in terms of educational streaming, but less 
time is spent at school or in institutional childcare and the pension system is rather non-
egalitarian. Mediterranean countries are similar to conservative countries in terms of 
educational streaming, participation in institutional childcare, time spent at school. They 
have the least egalitarian pension system in the sample.  
In terms of streaming policies, we can see in Figures 1 and 2 that – with the exception of 
Luxemburg – countries classified by Esping-Andersen (1990) as conservative are situated in 
the bottom half of the distribution of the variance in reading performance within schools and 
in the top half of variance in reading performance between schools – indicating that 
compared to the other countries in the sample, conservative countries seem to stratify 
students to a larger extent in different schools. Esping-Andersen’s social-democratic 
countries, on the other hand, are situated in the top half of the distribution of variance 
                                                      
10 See the list of country abbreviations at the end of the paper for an explanation of the abbreviations 
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opposed to the market or the family (participation in early childhood education, hours spent 
at school and hours spent in extracurricular activity). We understand this measure set as 
indicating the market-state boundary. Table 3 shows the associated means of the resulting 
clusters for all measure sets.  
The clustering of the pension stratification data (column 2 in Table 2) shows that there are 
two main groups of countries: a large group of countries with a relatively high mean ratio 
between the replacement rates of low and high earners and a relatively high replacement 
rate for the mean earner (see Table 3) and a small group of egalitarian countries, namely the 
liberal countries Ireland and the UK, Belgium and the Czech Republic.12 Liberal countries 
have been characterised by Esping-Andersen (1990) as empowering the free market; there is 
some theoretical foundation to the fact that they would display an egalitarian state-provided 
pension system with low replacement rates in general. The Czech Republic is the only CEE 
country that has not yet undergone a state reform of the pension system.  
The education clustering (column 3 in Table 2) shows a similar picture as the descriptive 
results shown in section 5.1: the first cluster shows a group of countries containing four of 
Esping-Andersen’s conservative countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands), Italy and three CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia). 
These countries can be classified as following the Germanic education model. As Table 3 
shows, these countries can be described as having quite a strong culture of streaming 
children into different schools and by a high exposure to state-provided education.  
The second cluster in the education clustering is a mixture of Scandinavian, Mediterranean 
and liberal countries, which display a relatively high degree of within-school variance in 
educational performance and a low degree of between-school variance. They can be 
classified as following models similar to the Anglo-Saxon, French or Scandinavian systems. 
The countries in this group are characterised by a weak culture of streaming and a high 
exposure to state-provided education.  
The third cluster consists of three countries (Estonia, Greece and Poland) that are 
characterised by a quite low rank in participation rates in institutional childcare, a low 
degree of streaming into different schools and low numbers of hours spent at school, but a 
relatively high exposure to market-provided learning.  
Japan constitutes the fourth cluster in the education clustering and is characterised by a high 
variance in reading performance both within and between schools, medium participation in 
early childhood education, a relatively high number of hours spent at school and a 
particularly high mean and variance in extracurricular activity. Japanese children are highly 
exposed to educational environments and variance in performance is high. The 
independence of Japan from other clusters seems mainly to be driven by high extracurricular 
activities.  
By combining the education and pension measure sets (column 4 in Table 2), we aim to find 
out whether countries that intervene to a large extent in the stratification process in 
education also intervene strongly in the stratification process in pensions. In other words, we 
are interested in whether countries can be grouped into those with a ‘culture of intervening 
in the stratification process’ and those not intervening in the stratification process – in terms 
of the education and the pension system. Countries can be clustered into three groups: 
1)  countries in which the state plays an important role and stratification is reproduced both 
in education and in pensions (mainly conservative countries, some CEE countries and 
Italy)  
                                                      
12 Descriptive data shown in Figure 5 also illustrate that these four countries are the most egalitarian in 
terms of the pension system. EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 19 
 
2)  countries in which both the pension and the education system tend to be more egalitarian 
and the market plays a more important role (social-democratic, liberal, Mediterranean 
and some CEE countries) 
3)  Japan, which is characterised by a relatively egalitarian system in terms of pension 
stratification combined with a low replacement rate for the median earner, strong 
between- and within-school variance and a particularly high amount of time spent in 
extracurricular activities.  
Results from the education and the pension measure sets separately or jointly (the measure 
sets “Education”, “Pension” and “Education and Pension” in Table 2) all indicate that there 
is a cluster containing the more non-egalitarian countries and one displaying the more 
egalitarian countries.  
In a next step (column 5 and 6 in Table 2) we split the measure sets into a set of variables 
measuring the explicit intervention of the state in the stratification process (pension 
stratification and school streaming policies) and a set of variables measuring the extent to 
which the state as opposed to the market provides learning environments (participation in 
institutional childcare, hours spent at school and hours spent in extracurricular activities).  
Studying the measures of explicit state intervention (measure set “Streaming and Pension”, 
column 5 in table 2) we can see that countries can be roughly clustered into groups of either 
high or low equality in the pensions system combined with either high or low educational 
equality. The first group consists mainly of conservative countries, some CEE countries and 
Italy. It is characterised by non-egalitarian pensions and high educational inequality (a high 
degree of between-school streaming). The liberal countries form a separate group, 
characterised by low between-school streaming and a small difference in replacement rates 
of pensions for different earners. The Nordic and Mediterranean countries form another 
group, characterised by low levels of between-school streaming but high levels of 
stratification in the pensions. A fourth group consists of Belgium, the Czech Republic and 
Japan, characterised by both high within- and between-school streaming and an average 
level of stratification in the pension system.  
The measure set indicating the extent to which the state intervenes as opposed to the market 
results in a clustering of two main groups and Japan (measure set “Learning and Pension”, 
column 6 in Table 2). The first group of countries seems to intervene less in the provision of 
pensions and education: provisions of pensions are lower, participation in institutional 
childcare and time spent at school are lower but non-state provided extracurricular activity is 
also low compared to the second group of countries. The second group of countries can be 
described as having a higher pension replacement rate, higher participation in institutional 
childcare, more hours spent in school and a somewhat higher degree of extracurricular 
activity. Japan is characterised by a small pension system (a low replacement rate to the 
median earner), medium participation in institutional childcare, relatively high number of 
hours spent at school and a high degree of extracurricular activity, indicating a more market-
influenced system.  
We can combine the findings of the fifth and the sixth column (column 5 and 6 in Table 2 
taken together) and group countries into those that are 
•  less egalitarian in the stratification process and provide learning environments to a larger 
extent by the market – such as Austria, Germany, Hungary and Slovenia.  
•  less egalitarian in the stratification process and guarantee the provision of learning 
environments to a larger extent by the state – such as Italy and the Netherlands.  
•  more egalitarian in the stratification process and in which the state provides learning 
environments to a larger extent than the market – such as Ireland and the UK. 20 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
•  more egalitarian in the stratification process of education (but not of pensions) and leave 
the provision of learning environments to a larger extent to the state – such as Denmark, 
Greece, Iceland, Luxemburg and Spain. 
•  more egalitarian in the stratification process of education (but not of pensions) and leave 
the provision of learning environments to a larger extent to the market – such as Estonia, 
Finland, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. 
The results from model-based clustering show that countries can to some extent be grouped 
into those that are egalitarian (these countries tend to be the social-democratic, liberal and 
Mediterranean countries) or non-egalitarian (these countries tend to be rather the 
conservative ones), in terms of stratification of both the pension system and the education 
system but some countries can also be egalitarian in one but not in the other dimension. In 
terms of education systems, the results show that countries fall into groups of more and less 
egalitarian education systems. The extent of state intervention in education can be high or 
low for egalitarian countries but only high for non-egalitarian countries.  EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 21 
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Note: As noted in Table 1 PEN1, PEN2 and PEN3 indicate different rates of replacement ratios across 
earning groups (between the 2* median earner and the median earner (PEN1), the median earner and the 
0.5* median earner (PEN2) and the replacement rate of the median earner (PEN3)), STR1 indicates between 
school variance, STR2 within school variance (both STR1 and STR2 are measured in % of the average 
variance in student performance across OECD countries), LE1 indicates participation in early childhood 
edcuation (average of ranked values across age groups), LE2 hours spent at school (weighted sum over hours 
spent in schooling by different age groups), LE3 mean extracurricular activity and LE4 variance 
extracurricular activity (LE3 and LE4 are the mean and variance of the % of respondents).22 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
 
Table 3. Cluster means for each measure set 
 
4.3  Agglomerative hierarchical clustering 
In this section we analyse the results of the hierarchical clustering, which are from a 
methodological point of view more tentative. Results are generally similar to the results 
obtained from model-based clustering. They are presented in the form of dendrograms – as 
described in section 4. In this section we show some exemplary dendrograms. 
We use a methodology that provides two types of special p-values indicating the statistical 
validity of a cluster. The green p-values (they are found on the right side at each branch 
intersection and are called BP - “bootstrap probability”) are computed using a conventional 
bootstrap approach and indicate how often a certain cluster appears in each bootstrap run. 
The red p-values (they are found on the left side at each branch intersection and are called 
AU – “approximately unbiased”) are computed using a multi-scale bootstrap resampling 
technique and can be shown to be a more accurate approximation for unbiased p-values (see 
Suzuki & Shimodaira, 2006).  
                          Variables 
Measure Set
PEN1 PEN2 PEN3 STR1 STR2 LE1 LE2 LE3 LE4
Esping-Andersen
Conservative 158.3 175.0 0.6 62.2 54.4 12.6 861.8 5.3 46.4
Socio-democratic 188.0 152.0 0.7 13.6 85.6 11.5 757.0 3.9 12.8
Liberal 105.0 110.0 0.3 32.2 78.8 15.6 906.5 4.3 21.8
CEE 170.0 176.0 0.6 40.1 52.9 17.6 669.2 6.1 32.9
Mediterranean 187.5 192.5 0.7 45.3 60.3 12.2 870.5 6.6 29.6
Pension
Cluster1 180.56 177.22 0.67
Cluster2 112.50 122.50 0.38
Education
Cluster1 61.84 44.02 12.78 811.50 3.75 11.98
Cluster2 24.32 79.50 12.32 826.51 4.23 16.59
Cluster3 30.35 69.34 20.67 682.27 9.17 55.31
Cluster4 58.72 62.18 13.75 792.99 17.30 240.99
Education & Pension
Cluster1 178.75 195.00 0.74 62.55 48.64 14.34 820.50 4.25 16.31
Cluster2 162.31 152.31 0.57 25.28 74.31 13.28 787.69 5.07 22.86
Cluster3 160.00 140.00 0.34 58.72 62.18 13.75 792.99 17.30 240.99
Streaming&Pension
Cluster1 173.33 196.67 64.00 40.88
Cluster2 133.33 136.67 56.48 56.36
Cluster3 105.00 110.00 32.20 78.78
Cluster4 186.36 170.00 24.53 76.86
Learning & Pension
Cluster1 0.53 14.98 762.00 4.60 21.66
Cluster2 0.85 11.11 876.57 5.06 17.77
Cluster3 0.34 13.75 792.99 17.30 240.99
Note: As noted in Table 1 PEN1, PEN2 and PEN3 indicate different rates of replacement ratios across earning groups 
(between the 2* median earner and the median earner (PEN1), the median earner and the 0.5* median earner (PEN2) 
and the replacement rate of the median earner (PEN3)), STR1 indicates between school variance, STR2 within school 
variance (both STR1 and STR2 are measured in % of the average variance in student performance across OECD 
countries), LE1 indicates participation in early childhood edcuation (average of ranked values across age groups), LE2 
hours spent at school (weighted sum over hours spent in schooling by different age groups), LE3 mean extracurricular 
activity and LE4 variance extracurricular activity (LE3 and LE4 are the mean and variance of the % of respondents).EDUCATION POLICY AND WELFARE REGIMES IN OECD COUNTRIES | 23 
 
Figure 6 shows the clustering that results when using the “Education” measure set 
(including the streaming variables and the state- and market-provided learning 
environments). These results correspond to those of the model-based clustering (Table 2 
column 3) – with the exception of Finland. The larger first cluster found using model-based 
clustering is further split when using hierarchical clustering: the Netherlands, Italy and 
Belgium are split into a separate cluster. As calculations of the group-specific means show 
(Table 3), the difference in participation in institutional childcare (which is higher in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy) drives this further split of the first cluster when using 
hierarchical clustering.  
Figure 7 depicts the results of hierarchical clustering for the “Education and Pension” 
measure set (including the education indicators and the indicators for stratification and size 
of the pension system). Results are again similar to the model-based clustering results in 
(Table 2 column 4) and again when using hierarchical clustering the data are divided into 
more groups than in the model-based clustering. The clusters on the left hand side of the 
dendrogram can be denominated as the less egalitarian countries with a large pension 
system and with the state providing to learning environments to a slightly higher extent than 
the market.  
The large cluster of less egalitarian countries (both in the education and in the pension 
system) is now split into three different groups with Italy and the Netherlands being split off 
and Greece and Luxemburg being grouped with Portugal and Spain. Italy and the 
Netherlands have a relatively high non-egalitarian pension system compared to the other 
countries in the first cluster in the model-based clustering (see column 4, Table 2).  
The second – more egalitarian – group of countries in column 4 in Table 2 is also split into 
smaller groups in the hierarchical clustering results. Ireland, the UK, Belgium and the Czech 
Republic form their own cluster, probably due to their comparatively egalitarian pension 
system. Estonia and Norway form another separate group possibly because they are 
characterised by similarly low between-school streaming, high within-school streaming and 
high participation in institutional childcare – in which they are similar to Denmark, Iceland, 
Sweden and Finland (a Nordic model). But they are also characterised by a relatively high 
mean and variance in extracurricular activity – in which they are not similar to Denmark, 
Iceland, Sweden and Finland. Poland – the remaining country in the clusters on the right 
hand side of the dendrogram – is characterised similarly to the Nordic countries.  
Figure 8 shows the hierarchical clustering results for the indicators measuring the extent to 
which the state as opposed to the market provides learning environments: “Learning and 
Pension”. Apart from Greece and Belgium, which have switched positions, the clustering is 
similar to the results in the model-based clustering. Again, the clusters are split further than 
when using the model-based approach. The three clusters on the left-hand side of the 
dendrogram contain countries that are characterised by a more state-based provision of 
learning environments – in particular, a higher number of hours spent at school and a higher 
replacement rate of pensions for the median earner. Conversely, the clusters on the right-
hand side contain countries characterised by a more market-based provision of learning 
environments (in particular, lower numbers of hours spent at school) and a more market-
based provision of pensions (a lower replacement rate for the median earner).  
The results obtained from hierarchical clustering largely confirm those obtained by model-
based clustering but offer a more nuanced picture by providing a set of further differentiated 
sub-clusters, which can be interpreted as being more tentative.  24 |  BEBLAVY, THUM & VESELKOVA 
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Figure 8. Dendrogram with p-values for the measure set “Learning and Pension” 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The paper explored the question of which countries deliberately attempt to reproduce social 
stratification through educational policies and which countries put greater emphasis on 
intervening in the stratification process. We were also interested in the relation between 
education policies and welfare policies as measures of intervention in the stratification 
process: do countries intervene in both education and welfare – driven by a ‘stratification 
culture’? Or is there a trade-off between education and welfare in which countries intervene 
in either education or welfare?  
Our conceptualisation of how policies influence stratification in education and welfare was 
based on looking at:  
-  the explicit stratification in the public system and  
-  the boundary between family/market and the state provision disaggregation. We find 
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combinations reflecting equal thinking about the proper role of public policy 
(stratification ‘culture’), but also combinations.  
-  Clustering in terms of both above-mentioned dimensions combined. 
5.1  Clustering in terms of explicit stratification in the public system 
We find three different options of clusters. There are two pure types: 
-  with emphasis on equalisation in both areas, present in the two Anglo-Saxon countries 
studied 
-  with stratification in both, a cluster in which – “there is a proper place for everyone in 
society” and present in Germany and countries generally neighbouring Germany and 
historically influenced by its welfare and education policies, including several post-
communist ones. 
However, as already noted, there are also mixed clusters. Particularly interesting is a large 
mixed cluster where equality in education policy is combined with stratification in pensions, 
something we could call “equality of opportunity, not of outcomes”. This cluster combined 
Nordic and Southern countries.  
The fourth option – equal pensions with a stratified education system seems to be rare and of 
a more random nature. Information on the four clusters is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Explicit stratification vs. equality in the public system 
 Education 
Stratification Equalisation 
Pension Stratification AT, DE, HU, IT, NL, SI  DK, EE, FI, GR, IC, LU, NO, PL, 
PT, ES, SE 
Equalisation  BE, CZ, JP  IE, UK 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
5.2  Clustering in terms of the extent of public vs. family/market 
involvement 
On the other hand, there is consistency between education and pension policies in terms of 
the extent of public vs. family/market involvement. With the exception of Japan, there are 
just two clusters.  
The first cluster, which is more etatist on both fronts (more school instruction time, more 
early childhood education, less variance on extracurricular lessons, higher pension 
replacement rates). It contains a mixture of Nordic and Southern countries, but it should be 
noted that only a minority of the Nordic countries is involved.  
The second cluster, which is more family/market-dependent both in terms of pension and 
education, contains a combination of Germanic, Anglo-Saxon and Central Eastern European 
countries, but also several Nordic countries.  
In this case, rather than the particular division of countries into clusters, we find the 
congruence between education and pension policies to be an intriguing one. 
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Table 5. Family/market vs. state provision in education and pension policy 
Type Countries 
More etatist in both  DK, GR, IC, IT, LU, NL, ES 
More family/market-oriented in both  AT, BE, CZ, DE, EE, FI, HU, SE, NO, PL, PT, 
SI, IE, UK 
Special case  JP 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
5.3  Clustering in terms of combined dimensions 
We also explored clustering for the combined questions, where countries can be clustered 
into three groups:  
-  countries characterised by a non-egalitarian system in pension replacement rates but 
providing the median earner with a relatively high replacement rate and in terms of 
educational indicators, by high between-school streaming, low within-school streaming, 
the state as opposed to the market or the family providing to a large extent for learning 
environments. The state plays an important role and stratification is reproduced both in 
education and in pensions. 
-  countries displaying on average a more egalitarian system in terms of pension 
stratification, a lower replacement rate for median earners and – in terms of education – 
low between-school variance, high within-school variance in reading performance and 
the market providing for learning environments to a slightly larger extent than the 
market. Both the pension and the education system tend to be more egalitarian and the 
market plays a more important role. 
-  Japan, which is characterised by a relatively egalitarian system in terms of pension 
stratification combined with a low replacement rate for the median earner, strong 
between- and within-school variance in terms of educational performance and a 
particularly high amount of time spent in extracurricular activities. 
Looking at the relationship of the findings with traditional typologies, especially the welfare 
regime typology of Esping-Andersen, we find that when one looks specifically at 
stratification mechanisms (E-A’s research question was wider) and takes into account both 
education and pensions, the following emerges: 
-  the difference between ‘traditional’ conservative countries and Southern Europe is much 
more marked than in Esping-Andersen’s analysis, 
-  post-communist countries do not make up one type, but adhere to either Germanic or 
Nordic country models, largely in alignment with their history and/or geography (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia being closer to Germany, Poland and Estonia 
closer to the Nordic countries, but not invariably so), 
-  the Nordic countries’ difference vis-à-vis the conservative Continental states can easily be 
overstated, since these groups tend to share significant stratification in pensions and also 
are not, in several cases, as state-dependent as is usually thought. This requires more 
analysis and exploration. The key dividing line between Germany and Scandinavia 
seems to go through streaming, where they adopt completely different approaches, 
-  the absence of relevant data for France prevents us from integrating this very important 
country into the analysis. 
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This paper aims to challenge the one-policy-fits-all approach of advocating education policy 
reforms that are designed to reduce the effect of socio-economic status: namely early 
childhood education and late streaming (which are advocated by the OECD based on PISA 
surveys, for example). International or national policy-makers should take into account three 
facts/conditions found in this paper when implementing such policy reforms. The 
acceptability, implementation and results of such reforms are likely to differ significantly 
depending on the underlying conditions. The following three facts – implied by our findings 
– show in what way the introduction of policy reforms designed to promote equal 
opportunity in education could be unsuccessful in some countries: 
 
1.  First of all, the research shows that a culture of egalitarianism/stratification is rooted 
in very long-term factors, not just path-dependency, which can be seen inter alia from 
the fact that post-communist countries divided themselves into two groups, 
depending on their historical cultural ties. These longstanding factors are not 
necessarily easily overcome by a reform concentrating only on the education system. 
2.  We also showed that the interplay between a culture of stratification in welfare and 
education systems differs between countries: in some countries, there seems to be a 
trade-off where initial emphasis on equality of opportunity is coupled with 
acceptance of stratification in pensions, whereas in others there is a stratification 
culture (either egalitarian or pro-stratification) that becomes apparent both in the 
education and pension systems. This means that in countries with a trade-off 
implementing non-stratifying education policies, there might be more stratification in 
the welfare system as a result. 
3.  Thirdly, the presence of a stratification culture in countries does not neatly overlap 
with the state vs. family/market boundary, but cuts across it. This is important 
because it challenges frequent though lazy assumptions that acceptance of more 
inequality/stratification is associated with less state intervention. Therefore, our 
research shows that the extent of state intervention and the direction of the state 
intervention (pro-egalitarian or not) are two separate dimensions, which together 
produce differentiated results. This fact should be taken into account when 
implementing a policy reform to increase educational equality in a specific country. 
 Therefore – and this is the main policy implication of our paper – the implementation of 
education reforms designed to increase equal opportunities in education should be 
approached with caution, in the sense that the whole system of the particular country (the 
country context) should be taken into account to ensure successful policy reform. 
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List of country abbreviations 
at – Austria 
be – Belgium 
cz – Czech Republic 
de – Germany 
dk - Denmark 
ee – Estonia 
es – Spain 
fi – Finland 
gr - Greece 
hu – Hungary 
ie – Ireland 
is - Iceland 
it – Italy 
jp – Japan 
lu – Luxemburg 
nl – Netherlands 
no – Norway 
pl - Poland 
pt – Portugal 
se – Sweden 
si - Slovenia 
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